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1 Introduction
Liquidity, or lack thereof, was at the heart of the 2007–09 financial crisis. Many
large and important financial markets that were previously considered highly liquid
exhibited an unprecedented deterioration in market liquidity and elevated price
volatility, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Examples include
markets where counterparty risk or uncertainty about valuations cannot account
for the persistent drops in market liquidity, such as the foreign exchange market
(Mancini et al., 2013) and the U.S. Treasury market (Engle et al., 2012; Hu et al.,
2013). Dealer funding costs and balance sheet constraints (Gromb and Vayanos,
2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), along with slow-moving capital (Mitchel
et al., 2007; Duffie, 2010), have been proposed as likely drivers of the market
liquidity dynamics during the crisis, and these dynamics remain an active area of
research.
In this paper, we provide evidence on a new channel through which funding
constraints may impair liquidity in two-tiered over-the-counter (OTC) markets
(i.e., markets that feature an inter-dealer and a dealer-to-client segment), which
may help further explain the sudden and severe drop of liquidity experienced in
a number of financial markets during the recent financial crisis. The key intu-
ition is that dealer funding constraints also inhibit their ability to accommodate
other dealers’ trade requests, which leads to reduced activity in the inter-dealer
segment. As a result, dealers become less able to manage their inventories and
transfer risk among each other, which, in turn, further exacerbates their inability
to accommodate client trade requests and contributes to the liquidity dry-up. In
other words, dealer funding constraints affect liquidity, in two-tiered OTC markets,
both directly and indirectly via the inter-dealer segment.
3
Using data from the U.K. government bond (gilt) market from January 2008
to June 2011 (i.e., during the peak of the recent financial crisis and the beginning
of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis), we first show that the functioning of the
inter-dealer segment is an economically important determinant of market liquidity
in two-tiered OTC markets, along with (and controlling for) direct dealer balance
sheet constraint effects. We then show that the functioning of the inter-dealer
segment is itself adversely impacted by dealer balance sheet constraints and funding
costs. These findings combined illustrate the indirect effect of dealer constraints
on liquidity, via the inter-dealer segment of the market.
Our data are ideally suited for this task as they are derived from one of the
world’s largest government bond markets and also span an eventful period, includ-
ing the financial crisis of 2007–09, the first round of asset purchases by the Bank
of England (commonly known as quantitative easing, or QE), and the onset of
the eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011. We use transactional data that cover
secondary-market activity for all conventional gilts outstanding at any point during
our sample period. The unique feature of our data is that they contain all trans-
actions involving the primary dealers in the gilt market, including the identity of
the dealer, transaction price, volume, and buy/sell flag. This allows us to associate
gilt liquidity with dealer activity both in the time series and the cross-section of
gilts and dealers.
We first examine the liquidity conditions in the gilt market over the January
2008 to June 2011 period, focusing on both aggregate and gilt-specific liquidity.
We measure aggregate gilt market liquidity using the yield curve Noise, a measure
of mispricing along the yield curve, as proposed by Hu et al. (2013). We document
that the U.K. yield curve Noise increased almost fivefold during 2008, with the
sharpest increase occurring in the wake of the Lehman Brother’s default between
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October and December of 2008, similar to the liquidity deterioration experienced
in the U.S. Treasury market during this period. We also estimate gilt-specific
liquidity using individual gilt quoted spreads, as well as a new measure of the
effective spread that is motivated by Jankowitsch et al. (2011) but is not biased
by the intra-day volatility of the efficient price.1 Using both of these gilt-specific
liquidity metrics, we show that execution costs in the dealer-to-client segment of
the gilt market almost doubled during the recent financial crisis and remained
elevated for a prolonged period of time.
We next examine how liquidity is influenced by primary dealer activity. For
this, we first test three hypotheses that are motivated by the theoretical literature.
In particular, we conjecture that market liquidity is directly and adversely affected
by: (1) dealer balance sheet constraints, (2) less inter-dealer trading, and (3) less
dealer competition.
The first hypothesis is motivated by the relation between funding and market
liquidity as formalized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The intuition is
that as dealers expand their balance sheets, in response to client order flow, they
become increasingly constrained and their ability to warehouse additional risk is
diminished, contributing to reduced liquidity.
The second hypothesis is also motivated by the microstructure literature (e.g.,
Ho and Stoll, 1983), which suggests that the inter-dealer segment is used by dealers
to share risk in two-tiered OTC markets.2 Consider, for example, a dealer whose
client wants to sell a large quantity of long-term gilts. In the presence of an active
inter-dealer market, the dealer could accommodate the client’s order knowing that
1Zˇikesˇ (2017) further develops and examines in depth the asymptotic properties of this esti-
mator.
2See also Lyons (1995) and Reiss and Werner (1998) for empirical evidence in the FX and
stock markets respectively.
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she can subsequently offload some - or all - of these gilts in the inter-dealer market
to reduce her inventory risk. A less active inter-dealer market might instead force
the dealer to offer to only buy the gilts at a deep discount as compensation for
the increased inventory risk. Therefore, reduced inter-dealer activity would ceteris
paribus imply that dealers end up with riskier inventories because they would be
less able to share risk with each other. This, in turn, would lead to less liquidity.
The third hypothesis, on the impact of dealer competition on liquidity (e.g., as
in Huang and Masulis, 1999), could also be relevant for our study because some
dealers were more constrained than the rest, during our sample period, while others
(such as Lehman Brothers) exited the market altogether. This may have changed
market dynamics, rendering liquidity provision less competitive and thereby raising
execution costs.
With this in mind, we test these three hypotheses, in time series and panel
regressions, controlling for other well-known determinants of market liquidity such
as gilt characteristics and market conditions. We find broad support in the data for
the first two hypotheses and weaker support for the third. Dealer balance sheet
constraints and a lower fraction of inter-dealer trading are associated with less
liquidity both in aggregate and in the cross-section of gilts with both effects being
also economically significant. For instance, a one standard deviation decrease in the
fraction of inter-dealer trading leads to an increase in trading costs, as captured by
the effective and quoted bid-ask spreads, of about £460,000 to £1.4 million daily for
end-users. This suggests that the inter-dealer segment in two-tiered OTC markets
plays a key role in facilitating dealer inventory management and risk sharing, as
formalized by Ho and Stoll (1983).
Given the significant impact of inter-dealer trading on liquidity, we then exam-
ine what drives inter-dealer trading itself. Our forth hypothesis therefore is that
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balance sheet constraints and elevated funding costs inhibit dealers’ ability to ac-
commodate each others’ trade requests. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the
fraction of inter-dealer trading for each individual dealer and condition it on dealer-
specific and aggregate market characteristics. We find that, indeed, when dealers’
balance sheets are most constrained, dealers decrease their relative amount of inter-
dealer trading. Furthermore, we find that dealers mainly decrease the anonymous
trading that they do with each other (via inter-dealer brokers), while their relative
amount of direct, non-anonymous, trading does not significantly change. Thus,
consistent with evidence from other markets (e.g. Di Maggio et al., 2017), dealers
appear to strive to maintain their trading relationships, even when their balance
sheets are constrained, by accommodating non-anonymous trade requests from
other dealers.
More generally, the impact of balance sheet constraints on inter-dealer trading,
suggests that the former can indirectly affect market liquidity, in two-tiered OTC
markets, by inhibiting inter-dealer trading. Our conclusion therefore is that the
relation between liquidity and dealer balance sheet capacity constraints, in two-
tiered OTC markets, can be more complex than previously thought.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
related literature. In Section 3, we describe the structure and recent developments
in the U.K. gilt market and in Section 4 we describe our data and present summary
statistics. In Section 5, we define the various liquidity measures and show estimates
of gilt market liquidity over our sample period. In Section 6, we present the main
hypotheses and the results from the time-series and panel regressions and we also
explore the determinants of inter-dealer trading. In Section 7, we conclude. The
Appendix provides more details on the effective spread measure that we propose.
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2 Related literature
Our paper is most closely related to a number of studies that aim to understand
OTC market dynamics and in particular the role of the inter-dealer segment in two-
tiered markets. The seminal paper is Ho and Stoll (1983), which formally shows
how the inter-dealer market can allow dealers to share inventory risk. Viswanathan
and Wang (2004) and Dunne et al. (2015) explore the role of adverse selection in
two-tiered markets and show that asymmetric information between clients and
dealers can lead to breakdown of the inter-dealer segment. On the empirical side,
Lyons (1995) documents that an FX dealer systematically uses the inter-dealer
segment to control her inventory, while Reiss and Werner (1998) show that dealers,
active on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), trade with each other more when they
have extreme and opposite inventory imbalances. Our paper contributes to this
literature by linking inter-dealer activity with market liquidity and by showing
that when dealers are constrained they are less able to accommodate each others’
trades in the inter-dealer segment, thus leading to a deterioration of inter-dealer
activity.
Next, our work is related to the literature on the relation between market
liquidity and funding constraints. Gromb and Vayanos (2010) provide a survey of
the theory, while Krishnamurthy (2010) discusses a range of empirical examples
from the 2007–09 financial crisis. In the context of government bond markets, the
most relevant paper is that by Hu et al. (2013), who propose to measure market-
wide liquidity in the Treasury market by yield curve Noise, i.e., the deviations of
bond yields from a smooth fitted curve. They show that in periods of abundant
risk capital, arbitrage smooths out the yield curve, while in periods of funding
illiquidity and heightened risk aversion, large deviations in the prices of similar
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bonds may persist, consistent with the predictions of Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Duffie (2010), among others. Musto et al.
(2017) find that liquidity feedback loops amplified the price discounts in Treasury
securities during the recent financial crisis. In particular, less-liquid securities
tended to flow to investors with longer horizons, thereby increasing their illiquidity
but also their appeal to these investors. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) study the large
and persistent mispricing between nominal and inflation-linked Treasury securities
and, consistent with theory, find that the basis narrows when arbitrage capital
flows into the market. Finally, Fontaine and Garcia (2012) use Treasury coupon
bearing bonds to extract the value of funding liquidity and find that this predicts
lower risk premia for Treasury securities, as a sign of flight to quality, but higher
premia for other forms of debt, including corporate bonds.3 More recently, Bicu et
al. (2017) examine the impact of the leverage ratio requirement on the U.K. gilt
market. They show that during the period when the U.K. leverage ratio policy
was announced, gilt liquidity deteriorated conditional on such factors as funding
costs and inventory risk. However, the evidence on whether the effect is causal
is, according to the authors, inconclusive. Our paper contributes to this strand
of the literature by showing that, in two-tiered OTC markets, funding constraints
can affect the mispricing of the yield curve, as well as overall market liquidity, not
only directly (as the above papers show) but also indirectly by inhibiting activity
in the inter-dealer segment of the market.
Our paper is also related to a number of theoretical and empirical studies on
the role of dealer competition in OTC markets. On the theoretical side, our paper
3There are also several related papers that study the pricing effects of liquidity for corporate
bonds during the crisis. Examples include Bao et al. (2011), Choi and Shachar (2013) and
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). These papers find that liquidity explained a large share of corporate
bond yields during the financial crisis.
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is closest to Dutta and Madhavan (1997), who model tacit collusion among dealers,
and Bondarenko (2001), who formalizes the relation between the bid-ask spread
and the degree of dealer competition as captured by the number of active dealers.
On the empirical side, the most relevant paper is the one by Huang and Masulis
(1999), who document that bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market decrease
as competition increases after controlling for volatility.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the microstructure and liquidity
of sovereign bond markets, particularly during periods of significant market stress.
As highlighted by Engle et al. (2012) and Pelizzon et al. (2016), although there are
numerous papers covering the government bond market microstructure, there are
only a few studies on the recent episodes of market turbulence, such as the recent
financial crisis or the euro-zone crisis, along with the subsequent unconventional
monetary policy interventions. The few exceptions include Engle et al. (2012), who
propose a new dynamic order book model and study the joint dynamics of liquidity
and volatility in the U.S. Treasury market between 2006 and 2010. They find that
liquidity decreased dramatically during the financial crisis and that liquidity and
volatility exhibit negative feedback. Pelizzon et al. (2016) study the microstructure
of the Italian government bond market during the eurozone crisis of 2011–2012, and
document a strong relation between sovereign risk and market liquidity, as well as
a positive impact on market liquidity of the European Central Bank interventions.
Finally, Fullwood and Massacci (2017) study the related gilt futures market and
find that it is highly resilient. We add to this literature by examining the liquidity
of a thus far less-explored major European government bond market (that of U.K.
government gilts) during a period of severe stress. More importantly, we go a
step further by linking the observed liquidity dry-ups with the underlying market
structure characteristics.
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3 Institutional framework and market structure
Conventional gilts are nominal fixed-coupon bonds issued by Her Majesty’s Trea-
sury (HMT) on behalf of the U.K. government. Even though the gilts are listed on
the LSE, the vast majority of trading takes place over the counter. This involves
bilateral transactions between market participants either over the phone or via an
electronic trading platform (not operated by the LSE). Central to the functioning
of the gilt market are the so-called gilt-edged market makers (GEMMs). These
are financial institutions that have been designated as primary dealers in the gilt
market by the U.K. Debt Management Office (DMO), an executive agency of HMT
responsible for managing the debt of the U.K. government.
The GEMMs are obliged to provide liquidity in the secondary gilt market
by making “on demand and in all conditions, continuous and effective two-way
prices.”4. Practically, this means that GEMMs stand ready to make markets and
respond to a request for quotes by their customers at all times during normal
business hours. The spread between the bid and ask prices that the GEMMs are
required to quote should be “reasonable,” although the U.K. Debt Management
Office (DMO) does not provide a strict definition of what a “reasonable” spread
is, given that the spread varies depending on market conditions. Overall, the ra-
tionale is that by providing liquidity at all times, the GEMMs should ultimately
help reduce the borrowing costs for the U.K. government. In practice, the GEMMs
are the primary source of liquidity in the gilt market and are a party to the vast
majority of gilt transactions.
4United Kingdom Debt Management Office (2013), page 5. This obligation covers trades
between the GEMM and its customers only. The GEMM is not obliged to provide quotes to
other recognized GEMMs, inter-dealer brokers, or agency brokers, although the GEMM is not
prohibited from doing so. Additionally, this obligation does not cover rump gilts, which are bond
issues considered too small to be liquid.
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In exchange for their market-making obligations, GEMMs enjoy a number of
privileges, such as the exclusive right to participate in gilt primary auctions run by
the DMO and a non-competitive allowance of 10% of the amount of debt issued in
each auction. Additionally, GEMMs have a preferred counterparty status, which
means that the DMO will only deal with GEMMs when operating in the secondary
market. Although designated as such by the DMO, GEMMs are supervised and
monitored by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and are required to
report all their secondary-market trades in gilts to the FCA.
Apart from the GEMMs, an important element of the gilt-market structure are
the inter-dealer brokers (IDBs). These are firms that operate exclusively as inter-
mediaries between GEMMs, allowing them to complete transactions anonymously.
Should a GEMM wish to trade with another GEMM, a direct communication be-
tween the two parties would reveal the parties’ intentions to trade, which might
compromise dealers’ ability to effectively manage inventory. This, may in turn
adversely affect market liquidity. IDBs themselves are not allowed to take propri-
etary positions, and they deal on a matched principle basis. In addition to the
IDBs, there are also agency brokers operating in the gilt market who may broker
trades between dealers and end-investors.
The GEMMs play a key role in the primary market for gilts as well. The
DMO typically sells gilts either via outright auctions in which only GEMMs can
participate, or via syndications. In a syndication, the DMO selects a group of
GEMMs to manage the sale of a gilt on its behalf. When issuing debt, the DMO
may either issue a new gilt or “tap” an existing gilt, i.e., it may sell an additional
amount of a previously issued gilt. This typically happens multiple times over a
number of years.
In response to the recent financial crisis, the Bank of England (BoE) introduced
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a program of asset purchases financed by central bank reserves, commonly known
as quantitative easing (QE). During the first round of QE from March 2009 to
January 2010, which overlaps with our sample period, the BoE purchased £200
billion worth of gilts in the secondary market via reverse auctions. These purchases
represented a significant fraction of issuance and seemed to have lowered gilt yields
(Joyce and Tong, 2012). At the same time, new issuance of gilts by HMT continued
at a relatively fast pace amid the recession following the financial crisis. Figure
?? shows the cumulative amount of debt issued by HMT, the cumulative amount
of QE purchases, and the difference between the two, i.e., the free float. One can
see that the free float remained relatively stable during the QE period, as QE
purchases reduced stocks by almost as much as HMT increased them.
4 Data and summary statistics
The main source of our data is the ZEN database maintained by the U.K. Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA).5 ZEN contains reports for all secondary-market trades
in gilts where at least one party is an FCA-regulated entity. Given that all GEMMs
are U.K. domiciled and hence FCA-regulated institutions, our data fully cover the
trading activity of these institutions.
Each transaction report contains information on the transaction date and time,
gilt International Identification Securities Number (ISIN), execution price, size of
the transaction, buyer/seller flag, and an agency/principle capacity flag. The
most important feature of the reports is that they contain the identity of the party
submitting the report and frequently, but not always, the identity of their counter-
5The ZEN data are also used by Czech and Roberts-Sklar (2017) to study how investors in
the U.K. corporate bond market react to changes in yields.
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party.6 However, because all FCA-regulated firms have to report their transactions,
a trade between FCA-regulated firms would be reported separately by each firm
and hence we can match these reports based on transaction characteristics. Thus,
we can match all reports pertaining to (1) direct inter-dealer trades, (2) all legs
of inter-dealer trades brokered by inter-dealer brokers, and (3) dealer–client trades
involving FCA-regulated end investors. Dealer–client trades involving non-FCA-
regulated end investors would only be reported once, by the GEMM, and we would
not always be able to identify the GEMM’s counterparty.
We match our transactional data with publicly available information on total
issuance, maturity, coupons, bond durations and end-of-day closing prices obtained
from the DMO.7 To construct daily quoted spreads, we use end-of-day bid and ask
quotes from Bloomberg.8
We use the BoE’s data on QE auctions to adjust the total amount outstanding
of each gilt by the BoE’s purchases and construct the total privately held amount of
each gilt (free float). We also use daily time series for a number of other variables:
we obtain the five-year U.K. sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread from
Markit, the three-month sterling London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) from
Datastream and daily values of the three-month sterling general collateral repo
rate from the BoE.
Our sample covers the period from January 2008 to June 2011 and consists of
6We do not always see the counterparty identity because dealers sometimes use an internal
code to designate their counterparties that cannot be used to directly infer the counterparties’
identity.
7Gilt prices produced by the DMO during our sample period, were calculated by “...collating
mid-market closing prices from each Gilt-edged Market Maker (GEMM) for those gilts in which
it made markets (conventional gilts, index-linked gilts, or both, with the exception of rump gilts
and STRIPS). The DMO published an averaged mid-price, together with an associated gross
redemption yield, as the Gilt-edged Market Makers Association (GEMMA) reference price.” For
more information see: http://dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/Daily_Prices
8Bloomberg collects this information from dealers and reports their averages.
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883 business days. There were 43 different conventional gilts traded at some point
during this period, including gilts issued both prior to the beginning of the sample
period and during the sample period. The number of primary dealers over 2008
to 2011 varies as some firms lost their GEMM status (e.g., Lehman Brothers due
to bankruptcy in 2008 and Commerzbank AG due to resignation in 2009) while
new firms acquire it (e.g., Nomura in March 2009 and Toronto Dominion in April
2010). In total, there were 24 different GEMMs during the sample period.
Table ?? reports summary statistics for the gilts in our sample. For every
six-month period, starting in June and December, we group the outstanding gilts
into four residual-maturity buckets and calculate for each bucket the number of
gilts outstanding, together with cross-sectional statistics for coupon, issuance, and
percentage of issuance held by the BoE through its QE program. The table shows
that the number of gilts outstanding, as well as the average issuance increased over
time across all maturities. The average coupon decreased during the sample period,
mainly for shorter maturity gilts, reflecting the cuts in the BoE rate (i.e., the BoE’s
main policy rate) and the fact that the DMO issues new gilts with market value
close to par. The asset purchases by the BoE removed on average between 25%
and 45% of the issuance depending on the residual maturity bucket and particular
point in time, though the cross sectional maxima show that, at times, as much
as 57% of the amount outstanding of a gilt was held by the Bank. Note that the
cross sectional statistics vary over time not only because of the Bank’s purchases,
which were spread over 10 months, or because the gilts transition between maturity
buckets, but also because the DMO tapped some of the outstanding gilts and thus
increased the issuance of these gilts.
We next report summary statistics for market activity during our sample pe-
riod. We measure all activity variables in par value terms throughout. Figure ??
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shows that the monthly traded volume fluctuated between £200 billion and £400
billion. These numbers are large – they equal around 3 to 6 times the monthly
traded volume of the shares listed on the LSE during the same period. The traded
volume increases over time, partly reflecting the increasing stock of gilts in issue,
as shown in Figure ??. However, the traded volume did not fully keep up with the
rising issuance. As the bottom chart of Figure ?? shows, the monthly turnover
actually decreased from 0.8 in January 2008 to 0.4 in June 2011. This implies that
while in January 2008 the entire stock of gilts outstanding changed hands at a rate
of around 10 times per year, in June 2011 it was only around 5 times per year.
Similar drops in turnover were also observed in the U.S. Treasury market during
this period.9
Table ?? shows summary statistics of market activity in the cross section of
gilts. We group gilts into the four residual maturity buckets used in Table ?? and
report, separately for each half-year and bucket, statistics for the monthly trading
volume, the percentage of inter-dealer volume, the aggregate net secondary-market
dealer volume, and the degree of dealer activity concentration as captured by the
Herfindahl index. The statistics are calculated using all gilt-month observations
within each half-year and bucket. The reported numbers suggest that there is
considerable variation in the trading activity across the gilts in our sample. There
are gilts whose monthly turnover equals a multiple of their amount outstanding,
while others trade fairly thinly.
The proportion of inter-dealer trading, reported in the middle set of columns in
Table ??, also varies significantly in the cross-section and over time, ranging from
0% to almost 75%. Interestingly, the proportion of inter-dealer trading is sub-
stantially lower across all maturity buckets around the peak of the financial crisis
9SIFMA, www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx.
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between 2008-H1 and 2009-H2. In the next set of columns, we report statistics on
net dealer volume, which is the total amount of gilts bought minus the total amount
sold collectively by all dealers. The results show that dealers’ net position changes
are relatively small compared to the traded volumes and amounts outstanding.
However, it is important to reiterate that the net dealer volume reported here only
includes secondary-market trading activity.
Finally, in the last set of columns in Table ??, we report statistics on the degree
of dealer activity concentration, as captured by the Herfindahl index. The index
is calculated using the total volume traded by each dealer and by assigning a 50%
share to each dealer in any inter-dealer trade. The reported averages suggest that
dealer activity is generally moderately concentrated, with the shortest and longest
maturities being slightly more concentrated than the rest. The reported maxima,
however, also suggest that during the peak of the financial crisis, especially in
2009-H1, there were months and gilts on which trading was more concentrated,
with the Herfindahl index reaching levels above 0.5.
5 Gilt market liquidity
We start our analysis by measuring liquidity in the gilt market during our sam-
ple period. We use different liquidity metrics exploiting both end-of-day quote
information, as well as our unique transactional data. Specifically, we construct
three liquidity measures: one describing aggregate liquidity and two calculated on
a gilt-specific basis.
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5.1 Aggregate liquidity
Following Hu et al. (2013), we use the yield curve Noise to measure aggregate
liquidity. The idea underlying the Noise measure is that in normal times, when
arbitrage capital is abundant, arbitrage forces will smooth out the yield curve
and keep pricing errors (Noise) small. When funding conditions tighten and risk
aversion rises, however, the ability and willingness of market participants to keep
bond prices aligned declines, and consequently the yield curve Noise increases. The
existence of arbitrage opportunities due to funding illiquidity is not the only source
of variation in the Noise measure. Widening bid-ask spreads can also contribute
to the widening of the Noise measure even if the law of one price holds when
accounting for transactions costs. The Noise measure therefore captures funding
and market liquidity in a bond market and serves as a good metric for gauging
overall liquidity conditions.
Constructing the Noise measure requires a smooth model of the yield curve.
Following Hu et al. (2013) and Malkhozov et al. (2014), we employ the well-known
Svensson model (Svensson, 1994) for the instantaneous forward curve:
f(m, b) = β0 + β1 exp
(−m
τ1
)
+ β2
−m
τ1
exp
(−m
τ1
)
+ β3
−m
τ2
exp
(−m
τ2
)
, (1)
where b = (β0, β1, β2, β3, τ1, τ2) is the parameter vector and m is the bond matu-
rity.10 As in Hu et al. (2013), we use conventional gilts with residual maturity
between 1 and 10 years to fit the Svensson model. However, we do not use sterling
Treasury bills in the estimation because they are known to be illiquid.11 While
10For robustness, we also experimented with cubic splines with and without a smoothness
penalty (Fisher et al., 1995). The results reported later in this section are qualitatively similar
across the different yield curve models and are available upon request.
11http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/wholesale_
tbs_3months.aspx
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the BoE uses repo rates to anchor the short end of the yield curve (Anderson
and Sleath, 2001), we avoid that so as not to plague our Noise measure with mi-
crostructure effects in the repo market. Letting Nt denote the number of gilts with
residual maturity between 1 and 10 years at time t, we estimate the parameters of
the Svensson model by minimizing the duration-weighted sum of squared pricing
errors:
bt = arg min
Nt∑
i=1
[
(P i(b)− P it )×
1
Dit
]2
, (2)
where P it denotes the end-of-day t reference price of gilt i as reported by the DMO,
P i(b) is the model-implied price of gilt i given parameters b, and Dit denotes the
MacCauley duration of gilt i on day t. Given the fitted yield curve, the Noise
measure is defined as:
Noiset =
√√√√ 1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
[yit − yi(bt)]2, (3)
where yit is the reference yield of gilt i on day t and y
i(bt) is the model-implied
yield of gilt i obtained from the zero-coupon yield curve corresponding to the
instantaneous forward curve f(m, bt).
Figure ?? shows the evolution of the Noise measure during our sample period.
For comparison, we also plot the LIBOR-repo spread, and the U.K. CDS spread.
Similarly to the Noise measure derived from the U.S. Treasury market by Hu
et al. (2013), we see that the U.K. Noise measure tends to be elevated during
periods of market turbulence, such as the demise of Bear Stearns in March 2008,
the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008, and the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. Additionally, we observe that although the
Noise started dropping significantly during the first quarter of 2009, the downward
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trend was temporarily interrupted during the first few months of the QE purchases
by the BoE, which were initiated in March 2009.
More importantly, Figure ?? reveals a high degree of co-movement between the
Noise measure, the LIBOR spread and the U.K. five-year CDS spread. Although
not perfectly synchronized, all three variables increase substantially during the
financial crisis from the fall of 2008 until the end of 2009. Given that the three
variables are, respectively, a measure of liquidity, a proxy for the cost of funding,
and a proxy for gilt inventory risk, this degree of co-movement is consistent with
the link between market and funding liquidity: dealers’ funding constraints, in
combination with increased inventory risk, reduce dealers’ ability to either engage
in or facilitate arbitrage trades.
5.2 Gilt-specific liquidity
To measure individual gilt liquidity, we use two different metrics. The first is the
quoted bid-ask spread normalized by the mid-quote. Thus, for gilt j and day t,
our quoted proportional bid-ask spread metric is:
BAjt =
Askjt −Bidjt
Midjt
, (4)
where Midjt =
Askjt+Bidjt
2
.
The second liquidity metric utilizes the transactional data from the dealer-to-
client (DtC) segment of the market and measures the proportional effective spread.
As our transactions data do not contain reliable time stamps, we cannot construct
intraday returns and measure the effective spread by using the first-order serial
covariance (Roll, 1984), as is common in the literature. Instead, inspired by the
dispersion metric developed by Jankowitsch et al. (2011), we base our measure on
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the average distance between the transaction price and the end-of-day midquote,
which does not require knowledge of the time stamps:
dˆjt =
√√√√ 1
njt
njt∑
i=1
(pij,t −mjt)2, (5)
where pij,t is the logarithmic price associated with DtC transaction i in gilt j
on day t, mjt is the logarithmic end-of-day midquote, and njt is the number of
transactions in gilt j on day t. However, this metric suffers from an important
drawback: centering each transaction price by the end-of-day midquote, rather
than the midquote prevailing at the time of the transaction, introduces an upward
bias due to the intraday volatility of the mid-quote. To obtain an accurate measure
of the effective spread, it is therefore necessary to remove the contribution of the
intraday volatility to the dispersion metric dˆjt. Assuming [as in Roll (1984)] that
the logarithmic intraday midquote follows a random walk and that market orders
arrive independently over time, this estimator removes the contribution of the
intraday volatility to the dispersion metric dˆjt. The proportional effective spread
can then be approximated by:12
ESjt =
√
max
{
2(3d˜2jt − dˆ2jt), 0
}
, (6)
where d˜jt =
√
1
njt−1
∑njt
i=1(pij,t − p¯jt)2 and p¯jt = 1njt
∑njt
i=1 pi,j,t. The idea underlying
this estimator is that dˆjt and d˜jt both depend on the effective spread and intraday
volatility in expectation, but the latter metric is less sensitive to intraday volatility
than the former. This gives us two equations with two unknowns and solving
these equations for the effective spread in the Roll (1984) model leads to equation
12In the Appendix, we summarize the derivation of the estimator.
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(??). The censoring of the statistic at zero ensures that the estimator remains
nonnegative. This approach is similar in spirit to the metric by Corwin and Schultz
(2012), who use daily high and low prices to disentangle the contribution of the
bid-ask bounce from the variation due to the mid-quote process, although we use
all transaction prices rather than just the daily high and low prices.
To reduce the noise associated with the daily liquidity metrics, we construct
calendar-month metrics by averaging the daily observations within each calendar
month. We plot these two metrics over our sample period in Figure ??. Both
metrics are clearly elevated during the financial crisis, although the effective spread
starts from a higher level and drops sooner, by the end of 2009. Both plots suggest
that the cost of trading in the gilt market almost doubled during the financial
crisis.
6 Liquidity determinants
Our main goal is to examine how liquidity is related to dealer balance sheet con-
straints, funding costs, and inter-dealer activity. In doing so, we also examine (and
control for) other potential determinants of liquidity that have been identified in
the literature. Below we list and discuss the main hypotheses of interest.
H1. Dealer balance sheet constraints have a negative direct impact on gilt-market
liquidity.
Our first hypothesis is that dealer balance sheet constraints translate into lower
liquidity provision. Balance sheet constraints, which may result from elevated
funding costs and/or directional client order flow, restrict dealers’ ability to ac-
commodate additional trade requests that would require them to further expand
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their balance sheet. As a result, when faced with such constraints, dealers quote
wider spreads. This intuition is formalized in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
H2. Less inter-dealer trading has a negative impact on gilt-market liquidity.
Our second hypothesis is that reduced activity in the inter-dealer segment of the
market has a negative effect on liquidity. This can happen if dealers use the inter-
dealer segment to transfer risk and manage their inventories, as in Ho and Stoll
(1983). Knowing that she cannot easily offload a client’s position in the inter-dealer
market, a dealer may charge a wider spread to accommodate clients’ requests.
H3. Less dealer competition has a negative impact on gilt-market liquidity.
A number of papers, such as Dutta and Madhavan (1997) and Bondarenko (2001),
have shown that competition among dealers affects liquidity. In an OTC market,
such as the one for gilts, there is a limited number of dealers whose ability to
warehouse risk varies over time and in the cross-section. Thus, it is plausible
that liquidity provision can become at times be concentrated to only a few dealers
who may choose to exercise market power. Our third hypothesis therefore is that
reduced competition will have a detrimental effect on liquidity.
H4. Dealer balance sheet constraints lead to reduced inter-dealer activity.
Our fourth hypothesis is that inter-dealer trading is itself a function of dealers’
ability to warehouse risk. Given the potential impact of inter-dealer trading on
liquidity, this hypothesis is crucial for establishing that dealer balance sheet con-
straints can indirectly affect market liquidity by limiting dealers’ ability to ac-
commodate each others’ trades, thereby making them less able to manage their
inventories and transfer risk.
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In the rest of this section we test these hypotheses by means of time-series and
panel regressions.
6.1 Liquidity time-series regressions
We first estimate a time-series specification of the aggregate liquidity Noise mea-
sure. We use, as regressors, variables that capture the various aspects of dealer
characteristics and dealer activity related to our hypotheses. We also use control
variables that capture market conditions and gilt characteristics. Our time-series
specification is:
∆Noiset =α +
1∑
i=0
(
βiNetdealervlmt−i + γi∆Interdealert−i + δi∆Herfindahlt−i
)
(7)
+ η′∆marketvarst−1 + θ′∆giltvarst + t,
where Netdealervlm is the aggregate net dealer volume, Interdealer is the
fraction of inter-dealer trading to total dealer activity, and Herfindahl is the
standard Herfindahl concentration index, which equals the sum of squared dealer
market shares. The market share of a dealer is in turn defined as the proportion
of trading volume of the dealer divided by the total trading volume by all dealers.
Aggregate net dealer volume is used as a proxy for changes in dealers’ invento-
ries and ultimately their balance sheet capacity to warehouse risk. The intuition
here is that as dealers’ inventories increase, dealers become less able to take on
additional inventory and their intermediation capacity declines.13 Thus, in the
13It is worth noting that signed net volume is a reasonable proxy for inventory imbalances
provided dealers hold positive inventories. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is indeed the
case in the gilt market, especially since the start of the BoE QE program in 2009.
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presence of such balance sheet constraints, we would expect a positive relation
between net dealer volume and marketwide illiquidity (Noise).
The fraction of inter-dealer trading is used as a proxy for dealers’ ability to
share risk in the inter-dealer market. If inter-dealer trading facilitates risk sharing
and inventory management, then we would expect a negative relation with the
Noise measure. Herfindahl, is intended to capture the degree of competition in
liquidity provision. If a more competitive market is also a more liquid one, then
we would expect a positive coefficient.
In terms of other controls, marketvars is a vector of market variables. We
include the LIBOR-repo spread as a measure of dealers’ and other market par-
ticipants’ funding costs and the U.K. CDS spread as a measure of inventory risk.
The market variables are lagged so as to ensure that they are predetermined with
respect to Noise. giltvars is a vector of aggregate gilt-market characteristics. To
proxy for the easiness with which gilts can be obtained to establish short positions
outside the repo market, we include the total amount of gilts available through se-
curities lending.14 We also include the aggregate cumulative value of gilt purchases
by the BoE, through quantitative easing, and the amount of gilts outstanding net
of QE purchases (free float). We include these variables to control for supply and
demand shocks that might correlate with the aggregate liquidity measure.
All non-stationary variables are differenced so as to avoid spuriousness and all
regressions are estimated using monthly data to reduce the contribution of high-
frequency noise. Thus, our time-series specification is rather conservative as the
differencing may result in information loss and the monthly frequency reduces the
number of observations. Additionally, the activity variables enter the specification
both contemporaneously and in lags so as to capture any effects that may last
14We obtained these data from Markit.
25
longer than a month.
The estimation results are reported in Table ??. For each activity variable, we
also test whether the sum of contemporaneous and lagged variable coefficients is
significantly different from zero and report the associated p-values. Aggregate net
dealer volume is positively and strongly correlated with the Noise measure across
specifications. This would be expected if dealers become more constrained when
their inventory increases, rendering them less able to respond to liquidity demands.
Inter-dealer trading is negatively associated with Noise, albeit the effect is only
significant when both contemporaneous and lagged variables are jointly tested.
This suggests that less inter-dealer trading is associated with less liquidity (i.e.,
more Noise), which is consistent with the intuition in Ho and Stoll (1983) that
inter-dealer trading facilitates risk sharing and inventory control. The Herfindahl
index of dealer concentration, on the other hand, appears to be uncorrelated with
Noise.
In terms of the market variables, we find that the LIBOR-repo spread is posi-
tively related to Noise and the effect is statistically significant in all specifications.
The LIBOR-repo spread alone explains almost 29% of the variation in the Noise
(column (1)). This is consistent with the idea that the higher the cost of funding,
the more difficult it is for dealers to fund their inventories and therefore the less able
they are to supply liquidity. Finally, the gilt variables all have the expected signs,
although the only consistently significant variable is the cumulative amount of QE
purchases. Overall, the results from the time-series regressions suggest that dealer
balance sheet constraints, along with reduced inter-dealer activity are significant
determinants of gilt-market liquidity.
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6.2 Liquidity panel regressions
We next exploit the panel structure of our data (i.e., over time and across gilts)
and conduct additional tests on the relation between gilt market liquidity on one
hand and dealer funding constraints, inter-dealer trading, and dealer competition
on the other. We employ the gilt-specific liquidity metrics and associate them with
aggregate and gilt-specific dealer activity variables. Specifically, we estimate the
following panel specification:
Illiqmetricit =α + β1Netdealervlmt−1 + β2Interdealerit−1 + β3Herfindahlit−1
(8)
+ γ ′marketvarst−1 + δ′giltvarsit−1 + vi + uit
where i denotes gilts (ISINs), t denotes months, and Illiqmetric is any of the two
gilt-specific (il)liquidity metrics defined in equations (??) and (??). These variables
are monthly averages of their daily values. Netdealervlm is, as before, the aggre-
gate net dealer volume across all ISINs and is a proxy for order flow imbalances
faced by dealers. It is an aggregate rather than a gilt-specific variable because
dealers’ balance sheet constraints are a function of their overall gilt trading. In
general, dealers can more easily accommodate clients’ demand for liquidity if client
order flow is balanced since they simply need to match buyers with sellers. On the
contrary, when client order flow is imbalanced, they need to deploy their inventory
to accommodate clients’ demands. This, however, may be difficult if dealers are
faced with balance sheet constraints. All in all, if balance sheet constraints matter,
we would expect a positive and significant relation between our illiquidity metrics
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and dealers’ lagged net aggregate volume. Interdealer and Herfindahl are also
defined as previously, albeit at the gilt level.
marketvars is a vector of market variables. As before, these variables include
the three-month LIBOR spread (difference between the three-month LIBOR and
the three-month repo rate) and the CDS spread on five-year U.K. sovereign CDS
contracts. giltvars is a vector of three gilt-specific characteristics: the duration,
the cumulative amount of gilt purchased as part of the BoE QE program, and
the total amount of gilts outstanding net of the QE purchases (free float). The
duration is a proxy for inventory risk since longer duration bonds are more sensitive
to interest rate fluctuations, while the cumulative QE and the free float capture
demand and supply dynamics.
Table ?? provides the summary statistics for the variables used in the regres-
sion. These statistics highlight both the temporal and cross-sectional variability of
our sample. The bid-ask and effective spreads range from 0.001% and 0.009% to
0.27% and 0.55%, respectively, while aggregate net dealer volume ranges between
£-11.8 billion and £14 billion. The fraction of inter-dealer trading ranges from
0% to 73% and dealer concentration also varies substantially, ranging from 6.6%
to 79%. Duration ranges from a few days (for newly issued gilts) to more than
20 years, while the cumulative amount of QE purchases ranges from £0 (for ma-
turities not purchased by the BoE) to about £13.6 billion. Finally, the free float
ranges from £2.57 billion to almost £28 billion.15
We estimate model (??), allowing for gilt-specific fixed effects. All independent
variables enter the specification with a lag to ensure that they are pre-determined
15The activity statistics reported here are comparable to those reported in Table ?? with
the only difference being that we now calculate statistics over the entire gilt-month universe
instead of specific half-year periods and maturity buckets. Additionally, net dealer volume is
now aggregated over all gilts.
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with respect to the dependent variables. Table ?? shows the results of these esti-
mations. A higher lagged aggregate net trading volume on behalf of the dealers
is invariably associated with increased execution costs, consistent with the notion
that as dealers’ balance sheets become more constrained, they are only able to
supply liquidity at a higher cost. This is consistent with the relation between
funding and market liquidity as formalized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
The coefficients on the share of inter-dealer trading (Interdealer) are negative and
significant across specifications for both measures of illiquidity. This is consistent
with the idea that dealers use the inter-dealer market to share and shift risk and
to the extent that they are less able to do so, they will demand a premium in the
form of higher spreads for the additional risk that they are forced to bear. The
coefficients on dealer concentration (Herfindahl) are also positive (albeit only sig-
nificant for the bid-ask spread specifications), suggesting that market power is also
a determinant (albeit a weak one) of the cost of liquidity. The control variables
also have the expected signs. The LIBOR spread and the CDS spread are posi-
tively and statistically significantly related to the illiquidity metrics. This suggests
that dealer funding costs and inventory risk all matter for gilt-market liquidity.
The importance of inventory risk is also evident in the positive coefficients on
gilt duration. Finally, free float is mostly insignificant, whereas cumulative QE
is mostly negatively associated with the illiquidity metrics. Overall, the results
on net dealer volume and inter-dealer trading are consistent with the ones in the
Noise specification (??) and confirm the role of balance sheet constraints and of
the inter-dealer segment in explaining variations in gilt market liquidity.
It is useful to also assess the economic significance of these variables. The
estimated coefficients in Table ?? suggest that a one standard deviation increase
in net dealer volume is associated with an increase in effective/quoted spreads by
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between 0.10 and 0.22 standard deviations or between 0.008% and 0.012% of the
prevailing mid-quote. Similarly, a one standard deviation decrease in inter-dealer
trading is associated with an increase in effective spreads by between 0.07 and 0.20
standard deviations or between 0.004% and 0.013% of the prevailing mid-quote.
While these effects may seem small, the average daily traded volume in the DtC
segment of the gilt market is fairly large, at about £10.5 billion. This means that
even small changes in spreads translate into large absolute changes in execution
costs. For example, when the above changes in spreads are multiplied by the daily
average traded volume of the DtC segment, the daily increase in execution costs
ranges from £820,000 to £1.3 million for every one standard deviation increase in
net dealer volume and between £460,000 and £1.4 million for every one-standard
deviation increase in inter-dealer trading.
6.3 Inter-dealer trading panel regressions
Given that inter-dealer activity has explanatory power over liquidity, we next exam-
ine whether dealers’ balance sheet constraints and funding costs have explanatory
power on inter-dealer trading itself. We exploit the fact that we observe trader
identities and calculate, for each dealer, the percentage of inter-dealer trading as
a fraction of their total volume and associate this with dealer-specific and market-
wide variables. Our empirical specification is a panel:
Interdealerit = a+βNetV lmRatioit−1+γDealer CDSit−1+δLIBOR Spreadt−1+vi+uit
(9)
where i denotes individual dealers and t denotes months. The dependent variable,
Interdealer, is the ratio of a dealer’s volume traded with other dealers divided
by the dealer’s total trading volume. We construct three versions of this ratio:
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one using all inter-dealer trades, one using only brokered trades and one using
only non-brokered trades. As mentioned in Section 3, inter-dealer brokers (IDBs)
enable dealers to trade with each other anonymously, which means that dealers face
a different set of incentives when trading via an IDB versus trading directly with
each other. For example, a dealer who is balance-sheet constrained and may not
wish to expand his inventory, may still accommodate a direct (i.e., non-anonymous)
sell request by another dealer so as to maintain a good trading relationship with
them. It is therefore of interest to examine whether balance sheet constraints affect
brokered and non-brokered inter-dealer trading the same way. NetV lmRatio is
the ratio of each dealer’s net volume divided by the dealer’s total volume.16 This
captures the degree to which each dealer’s balance sheet expands or contracts
relative to his total traded volume. If dealers become more constrained when their
balance sheet expands and therefore less able to accommodate other dealers’ trade
requests, then we would expect the coefficients on lagged NetV lmRatio to be
negative. Alternatively, when dealers are most constrained, they could in principle
seek to trade more in the inter-dealer market so as to alleviate these constraints.
In this case, one would expect the coefficients on NetV lmRatio to be positive.17
Dealer CDS is the dealer-specific five-year CDS spread and is used as an estimate
of the credit risk (and therefore of the funding cost) of each individual dealer.
Table ?? provides summary statistics of the dealer-specific activity variables
used in this specification. As one can see, inter-dealer trading accounts, on average,
for about 62% any given dealer’s volume. Of this, the largest fraction is brokered
(47% of total volume) and the remaining is non-brokered (14% of total volume).
16Given that the dependent variable is a ratio, we also specify this variable relative to total
volume.
17Unfortunately we cannot identify the initiators in the inter-dealer trades, so as to be able to
examine this in more detail.
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The results of the dealer panel regressions are shown in Panel A of Table ??.
The coefficients of NetV lmRatio are negative and significant, suggesting that as
dealers’ balance sheets expand, their ability to accommodate other dealers’ trade
requests declines. The coefficients on the LIBOR Spread suggest a similar story:
they are negative throughout indicating that the higher dealers’ funding costs, the
less able or willing they are to trade with other dealers. We repeat this estima-
tion using brokered and non-brokered inter-dealer trades and report the results in
Panels B and C respectively. The results suggest that it is mainly the brokered
inter-dealer trading volume that is reduced when dealers become constrained, with
the reduction in trading being both economically and statistically more significant
than in non-brokered volumes. For instance, a higher LIBOR spread is strongly
associated with less brokered trading but not significantly associated with non-
brokered inter-dealer trading. These results suggest that dealers try to maintain
their trading relationships with other dealers and primarily reduce their anonymous
trading when they become constrained. This finding is similar to the evidence in
Di Maggio et al. (2017), who show that dealers in the U.S. corporate bond market
continue to provide liquidity during periods of stress to those counterparties with
whom they have strong trading relationships. This suggests that similar trading
relationship dynamics are at play in the U.K. gilt market.
Overall, given the positive effect of inter-dealer trading on liquidity, documented
earlier, the fact that dealer balance sheet constraints and funding costs inhibit
inter-dealer trading suggests that the impact of these constraints on market liq-
uidity may be amplified in the presence of a two-tiered market (with an inter-dealer
segment), as it hampers dealers’ ability to share risk with each other.
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7 Conclusion
Using proprietary transactional data from the U.K. gilt market, we examine in this
paper the relation between dealer balance sheet constraints and market liquidity
in two-tiered OTC markets. In particular, we empirically identify an indirect link
between the two, that operates via the inter-dealer segment: as dealers become
constrained, they are less able to accommodate each others’ trade requests causing
the inter-dealer market to slow down. This, in turn, inhibits dealers from sharing
risk, which exacerbates illiquidity above and beyond any effects stemming from
individual dealers’ own balance sheet constraints.
Our findings highlight the inter-dependence of dealers’ balance sheets with
market liquidity. The effect we document is likely to be especially strong at times
of market-wide stress when large numbers of dealers become funding-constrained
at the same time, and as a result there is little spare aggregate balance sheet
capacity among them to facilitate risk sharing. Our paper shows that this effect
was at play in the U.K. gilt market during the peak of the recent financial crisis
and the onset of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, but we conjecture that it may
also have contributed to the sudden and pronounced drop in liquidity experienced,
at about the same time, in other two-tiered OTC markets as well, such as the
Treasury and FX markets.
More generally, our results suggest that the relation between funding and mar-
ket liquidity is dependent on the specific design and the institutional and organi-
zational characteristics of a given market and that these characteristics can poten-
tially amplify the effects on market liquidity previously identified in the literature.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the measure of effective spread introduced in Section
5.2. We assume that the day is divided into n subintervals of equal length (in tick
time) and that a transaction arrives at the beginning of each of these subintervals.
We also assume that the associated logarithmic transactions prices, pi, i = 1, ..., n,
are related to the logarithmic efficient price, mi, by:
pi = mi +
s
2
qi, i = 1, ..., n, (A.1)
where s is the proportional effective spread and qi is a binary variable indicating
whether the i-th transaction is buyer-initiated (+1) or seller-initiated (−1). Since
we cannot construct intraday returns, we cannot use the first-order autocovariance
to estimate s as is standard in the microstructure literature following Roll (1984).
Nor can we use the various realized measures developed in the financial economet-
rics literature (Ait-Sahalia and Jacod, 2014, Ch. 7) to estimate σ in the presence
of microstructure noise (induced by q). We can nonetheless construct statistics
that use all transactions prices but do not require the knowledge of time stamps.
In many OTC markets, the efficient price may be observable at some point
during the trading day. Here we assume for simplicity that m is observed at the
end of the day, i.e., at the end of the last subinterval n, and denote it by mn+1. To
estimate the effective spread s, we follow Jankowitsch et al. (2011) and consider
the statistic:
dˆ2 =
n∑
i=1
(pi −mn+1)2wi. (A.2)
where wi, i = 1, ..., n are weights satisfying
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. Jankowitsch et al. (2011)
take wi = Vi/
∑n
i=1 Vi, where Vi is the volume associated with transaction i. It is
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implicitly assumed in this measure that the intraday volatility σ of the efficient
price is small, so that substituting mn+1 for the unobserved mi entails only a minor
distortion when estimating s. Here we do not make this assumption.
If the efficient price is not observable, we can consider instead of dˆ2 the statistic:
d˜2 =
n
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(pi − p¯)2wi, (A.3)
where p¯ =
∑n
i=1 piwi is the mean transaction price. As will become clear shortly,
this statistic has similar properties to the one in equation (??) and is superior for
estimating s even when mn+1 is observable to the econometrician.
To get an idea about the properties of these estimators, we assume that the
logarithmic efficient price m follows random walk:
mi+1 = mi + i+1, i = 0, ..., n. (A.4)
If we further assume that qi is uncorrelated with mj for all i, j and take wi = 1/n,
it is straightforward to show that:
E(dˆ2) =
s2
4
+
σ2
2
(
n+ 1
n
)
. (A.5)
Similarly, for d˜2 we get:
E(d˜2) =
s2
4
+
σ2
6
(
n+ 1
n
)
. (A.6)
We see that both statistics are affected by the volatility of the intraday price and
hence are biased estimators of the squared proportional spread s2. Clearly, the bias
of the latter statistic, d˜2, is three times smaller than that of the original statistic
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proposed by Jankowitsch et al. (2011). Moreover, the difference between the two
statistics can be used to construct an unbiased estimator of s2:
sˆ2 =
1
2
(3d˜2 − dˆ2). (A.7)
By construction we have E(sˆ2) = s2. It is easy to see that the estimator is not
guaranteed to be nonnegative. To deal with the (occasional) negativity of the
estimator, we follow Corwin and Schultz (2012) and censor the estimator at zero.
The final estimator of the proportional effective spread is thus:
ES =
√
max
{
2(3d˜2 − dˆ2), 0
}
. (A.8)
This estimator of the proportional spread is based on the key observation that,
in expectation, dˆ2 is larger than d˜2 due to intraday volatility. To see if that is
the case in our data, we report in Table ?? some descriptive statistics for these
metrics. The statistics are pooled over gilts and are calculated for daily metrics
as well as for calendar-month metrics, which are obtained by averaging the daily
metrics within each calendar month. It is clear from the table that dˆ2 is on average
significantly higher than d˜2: the mean dˆ2 is more than twice as high as the mean
d˜2. Moreover, dˆ2 exceeds d˜2 on more than 99.9% gilt-days and gilt-months. The
uncensored estimator of the squared effective spread, sˆ2, does get occasionally
negative, in around 16% of the gilt-days in our sample, but as expected, averaging
over calendar months significantly reduces the variability of the estimator and
consequently the occurrence of negative estimates. We find negative sˆ2 in only
around 5% of the gilt-months in our sample.
In general, the lack of accurate time stamps is a common feature of many
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transactional data sets from OTC markets and hence our metric may be useful for
measuring liquidity beyond the application in this paper18.
18Examples of recently studied OTC transactional data sets that lack accurate time stamps
include the interest rate swap data (Chen et al., 2011) and the credit default swap data (Chen
et al., 2012; and Benos et al, 2013).
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the variables used in specification (??).
The illiquidity metrics are defined in equations (??) and (??). Netdealervlm is the
monthly aggregate (across gilts) net dealer volume (in £billions), Interdealer is the per-
cent of inter-dealer trading in each gilt-month and Herfindahl is the gilt-month sum of
squared market shares of the dealers. The market share of each dealer is the ratio of her
traded volume over the sum of the volumes traded by all dealers in a given gilt-month.
Libor Spread is the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month repo
rate (in %) and UK CDS is the spread (in bps) on the U.K. sovereign five-year CDS
contract. Duration is the bond duration in years; CumQE is the cumulative amount
of QE purchases by the Bank of England in each bond (in £billions) and Freefloat is
the total amount of debt outstanding for each bond (in £billions) adjusted for the Bank
of England stock of bond purchases; The sample period is January 2, 2008 to June 30,
2011.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BA (bid-ask spread, %) 1402 0.077 0.048 0.001 0.274
ES (effective spread, %) 1402 0.132 0.076 0.009 0.555
Netdealervlm (£billions) 42 -0.591 5.567 -11.757 14.000
Interdealer 1402 0.278 0.126 0.000 0.732
Herfindahl 1402 0.123 0.045 0.066 0.796
LIBOR Spread (%) 42 0.499 0.514 0.070 2.280
UK CDS (bps) 42 63.939 30.166 8.620 145.300
Duration (years) 1402 8.675 6.084 0.020 21.930
CumQE (£billions) 1402 3.023 3.999 0.000 13.159
Freefloat (£billions) 1402 15.211 5.749 2.573 27.766
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Table 6: Summary statistics of activity variables in specification (??).
Interdealer is the fraction of the individual dealer inter-dealer trading volume divided
by the dealer’s total traded volume, across all ISINs. NetVlmRatio is the dealer-specific
ratio of the dealer’s net volume divided by the dealer’s total volume.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Interdealer (All trades) 0.617 0.225 0 1
Interdealer (Brokered trades) 0.472 0.248 0 1
Interdealer (Non-brokered trades) 0.144 0.264 0 1
NetVlmRatio 0.002 0.235 -1 1
N 835
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the dispersion metrics dˆ2 and d˜2.
We report results for daily metrics (“daily”) and for calendar-month averages of daily
metrics (“monthly”), pooled across gilts (i.e., for gilt-days or gilt-months). The bottom
rows of the table report the percentage of gilt-days/gilt-months where the statistics
(dˆ2 − d˜2) and (3d˜2 − dˆ2) are negative.
daily monthly
dˆ2 d˜2 dˆ2 d˜2
no. obs. 24,110 24,110 1,402 1,402
mean 0.985 0.441 0.987 0.445
std. dev. 2.682 0.930 1.282 0.532
skewness 15.28 7.649 3.097 2.555
kurtosis 440.6 95.85 16.91 11.97
negative (dˆ2 − d˜2) 0.004% 0.071%
negative (3d˜2 − dˆ2) 16.28% 4.921%
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Figure 1: Issuance, free float and QE.
Total issuance, free float, and the stock of QE purchases in face-value terms (£bil-
lion) for the gilts in our sample. The sample period is January 2, 2008 to June 30,
2011.
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Figure 2: Trading activity.
The top chart shows the total monthly volume and monthly inter-dealer volumes (£bil-
lion, face value). The bottom chart shows the total monthly volume divided by the
amount of gilts outstanding (monthly turnover). The sample period is January 2, 2008
to June 30, 2011.
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Figure 3: Aggregate liquidity, funding costs, and inventory risk.
Noise (bps, top chart), LIBOR-Repo spread (%, middle chart) and the U.K. five-year
CDS spread (bps, bottom chart). The Noise measure is defined in equation (??). The
sample period is January 2, 2008 to June 30, 2011.
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Figure 4: Bid-ask and effective spreads.
Average bid-ask and effective spreads for the gilts in our sample. The gilt-specific versions
of these variables are defined in equations (??) and (??) respectively. The sample period
is January 2, 2008 to June 30, 2011.
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